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Toward a Universal Rule for the
Reasonable Disposition of Surface
Waters in California
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994 the California Supreme Court, in Locklin v. City of Lafayette,1
held that a rule of reasonableness governs uphill landowners who discharge
surface water into a natural watercourse.2  This rule eliminates the
immunity previously enjoyed by such landowners.3  In doing so, the court
extended the holding of Keys v. Romley,4 which imposed a rule of
reasonableness on those who divert surface water from their land onto the
land of another.5
In fashioning its rule of reasonableness, the California Supreme Court
expressly considered two competing policies:  1) equity, i.e., fairness as
1. 7 Cal. 4th 327, 867 P.2d 724, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (1994).
2. Id. at 337, 867 P.2d at 728, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620.  The court held:
When alterations or improvements on upstream property discharge an
increased volume of surface water into a natural watercourse, and the
increased volume and/or velocity of the stream waters or the method of
discharge into the watercourse causes the downstream property damage . . . a
property owner . . . may be liable for that damage.  The test is whether, under
all the circumstances, the upper landowner's conduct was reasonable.
Id.; see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
3. See Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941). The rule
articulated in Archer, known as the civil law watercourse rule, insulated uphill
landowners from liability for discharging water into natural watercourses, whether their
actions were reasonable or not.  See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
4. 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).  The court in Keys
held:  “[I]t is . . . incumbent upon every person to take reasonable care in using his
property to avoid injury to adjacent property through the flow of surface waters.”  Id. at
409, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 285.  See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying
text.
5. This Comment addresses only those damages caused by water.   These dam-
ages generally manifest themselves as erosion to the lower landowner's property or
structural damage to the buildings on the lower landowner's property due to flooding. 
This Comment does not address damage caused by the deposit of silt and mud on the
land of the lower landowner.  Such damage is governed by the law of nuisance.
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between the parties, and 2) the promotion of development.6  This Comment
suggests that another policy concern, that of overall economic efficiency,
should be considered on an equal footing with the first two concerns
because it promotes efficient use of resources and encourages the parties
to arrive at solutions that abate potential damage.7
This Comment further analyzes the rules announced in Locklin and Keys. 
Although the Locklin rule is described as an extension of the Keys rule to
a similar factual scenario,8 the two rules actually differ significantly.9  That
difference is responsible for a difference in impact on the three above-
mentioned policy concerns.10  This Comment also questions the necessity
of two different rules and proposes an integrated rule that is more effective
in harmonizing the three policy objectives.11
Part II of this Comment provides the general definitions of California
water law and discusses the development of California's water discharge
law doctrine up to its current position.  Part III discusses and analyzes the
three policy concerns previously mentioned, one of which is proposed by
this author.  Part IV discusses the universal rule that should be
implemented so as to eliminate the differences between the Keys and
Locklin rules and to synthesize the three policy concerns.  Part V is a brief
conclusion.
6. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 91-105 and accompanying text.  Briefly, efficient solutions
decrease the social costs generated by any given problem.  Rules that create bright line
delimitations of rights create the appropriate incentives for parties to negotiate the most
cost effective solutions to any given problem.
8. See infra text accompanying note 108; see also Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 7
Cal. 4th 327, 356, 867 P.2d 724, 752, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613, 642 (1994).  The court
stated:
[W]e agree with those courts which have held that Keys v. Romley states a
rule that is applicable to all conduct by landowners in their disposition of
surface water runoff whether the waters are discharged onto the land of an
adjoining owner or into a natural watercourse, as well as to the conduct of
upper and lower riparian owners who construct improvements in the creek
itself.
Id. at 357, 867 P.2d at 752, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642.
9. See infra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.  Briefly, the Keys rule dictates
that when both upper and lower landowners act reasonably in discharging and receiving
surface water respectively, the upper owner will be liable.  The Locklin rule dictates that
when both upper and lower landowners act reasonably in discharging and receiving
surface water in a natural watercourse, the upper landowner will be immune from
liability.
10. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.  Arguably, the Locklin rule is
more effective in promoting development and leads to more equitable results than the
Keys rule.
11. See infra part IV.B.
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II. CALIFORNIA WATER LAW DEFINITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Definitions
To appreciate the current state of this aspect of water law, one must
understand its historical roots.  Water law has traditionally evaluated the
rights and liabilities of property owners concerning the discharge of water
by classifying the offending water as 1) surface water, 2) water flowing
within a natural watercourse, or 3) flood water.12  Consequently, it is
necessary to understand how these terms are defined.
“Surface water” refers to water diffused over the surface of land or
contained in depressions, and which results from rain or snow, or which
rises to the surface from springs.13  It is not water flowing in a fixed
channel or water that has collected in a body of water such as a lake.
A “natural watercourse” is a channel, including a canyon or ravine, with
a defined bed and banks made by water and habitually used by water.14 
The water must run as a collected body or stream in those seasons of the
year and at those times when the streams in the region are accustomed to
12. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 344, 867 P.2d at 734, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623.  The court
stated that in the “arcane area of water law under consideration in this case, the rights
and liabilities of private property owners for property damage or personal injury are in
large part dependent upon the classification of the water.”  Id.  See, e.g., San Gabriel
V.C.C. v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554 (1920).  The San Gabriel
V.C.C. court noted that “[t]he difference between surface waters and those collected and
flowing in a watercourse is well recognized, and the same rules by no means apply to
one as the other.”  Id. at 398, 188 P. at 556.
13. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 345, 867 P.2d at 736, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 627; see San
Gabriel V.C.C, 182 Cal. at 398, 188 P. at 556 (“[Surface waters] in the legal sense are
those which fall on the land by precipitation from the skies or arise in springs and
spread over the surface of the ground without being collected into a definite body.”); see
also Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 315, 291 P. 825, 829 (1930) (“[S]urface waters
are those which are produced by rainfall, melting snow, or springs, and which in the
case of the two first mentioned sources are precipitated, and in the case of the last-
mentioned source, rise upon the land.”).
14. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 345, 867 P.2d at 736, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.  The
watercourse in Locklin was the Reliez Creek, a natural watercourse that drains a
watershed of approximately 2,291 acres outside of Walnut Creek, California.  The creek
is several miles long and runs down out of the hills to a confluence with Las Trampas
Creek.  Id. at 339, 867 P.2d at 730, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 321.  See also Youngblood v.
City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 2d 481, 325 P.2d 587 (1958).  Rivas Canyon and
Rustic Canyon, located in the Pacific Palisades area of Los Angeles, were both found to
be natural watercourses although water flows through these canyons only after rainfall. 
Id. at 485, 325 P.2d at 585.
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flow.15  The term “natural watercourse” can also include a man-made
channel if such a channel has existed for a sufficient period of time,16 but
a “natural watercourse” does not include a swale, hollow, or depression
through which surface waters may pass during a storm when they do not
collect into a defined stream.17  Furthermore, once “surface waters” have
become part of a stream in a watercourse, they are no longer recognized as
“surface waters.”18  Of course, when an extraordinary overflow of streams
or rivers takes place, the overflow is known as “flood water,” not “surface
water” or water flowing within a “natural watercourse.”19  The remedy for
15. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 345, 867 P.2d at 734, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623; see, e.g.,
Mogle v. Moore, 16 Cal. 2d 1, 104 P.2d 785 (1940).  The court in Mogle held that a dry
creek bed running alongside a road did constitute a natural watercourse.  In so doing the
court stated:
West Cucamonga creek did not lose its character as a watercourse nor did
its waters lose their character as stream waters after 1916, because the stream
bed was dry for periods of time.  It is thoroughly established in California that
a constant flow of water is not essential to the existence of a watercourse.  It is
sufficient if, during some seasons, water does in fact flow in the stream bed.
Id. at 8, 104 P.2d at 790 (citations omitted).
16. San Gabriel V.C.C., 182 Cal. at 397, 188 P. at 556.  In San Gabriel the water
channel in question was a man made storm drain constructed in 1913 which was an
improvement of the natural water course that had been flowing out of the Sierra Madre
Mountains and into Pasadena.  The court held that the drain had “now existed for such a
length of time as the channel for the natural drainage of the watershed . . . that the
manner of its creation is not material, and it has all the attributes of a water channel
wholly natural in its origin.”  Id.  See also Los Angeles County Flood Control v.
Mindlin, 106 Cal. App. 3d 698, 165 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1980).  A road that had been in
existence since 1919 was found to be the bank of a natural watercourse even though the
road, when installed, had altered the natural flow of the Santa Clara river.  Id.
17. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 345, 867 P.2d at 735, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
18. San Gabriel V.C.C., 182 Cal. at 398, 188 P. at 559; see also supra note 14.  In
San Gabriel the appellant argued that, under the circumstances, surface water cases
controlled.  The court noted:
[T]he present case is not concerned with surface waters, and the foregoing
decisions are not on point.  The waters upon which the drains here in question
act have lost their character as surface waters before they reach the drains and
have already been gathered into a definite body flowing as a stream in a 
watercourse.
Id.
19. 4 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, 977 (8th ed. 1987); see, e.g.,
Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 P. 825 (1930).  The court in Le Brun defined
flood waters as “those which escape from a stream or other body of water and overflow
the adjacent territory.”  Id. at 315, 291 P. at 829.  See also Mogle v. Moore, 16 Cal. 2d
1, 104 P.2d 785 (1940).  The court in Mogle stated:
The term `flood waters' is used to indicate waters which escape from a
watercourse in great volume and flow over adjoining lands in no regular
channel, though the fact that such errant waters may form themselves a
temporary channel or follow some natural channel, gully or depression does
not affect their character as flood waters or give the course which they follow
the character of a natural watercourse.
Id. at 9, 104 P.2d at 789.  But see Costello v. Bowen, 80 Cal. App. 2d 621, 631, 182
P.2d 615, 620 (1947).  The court in Costello stated:  “Excessive storm waters which
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damage caused by flood waters has been more consistent over the last
hundred years than has been the remedy for damage caused by the other
two forms of water;20 but, during heavy rain, the division between the three
forms of water can become obscured.21
B. History of California's Water Discharge Law
1. From the Common Law to the Civil Law Rule
At common law, the “common enemy doctrine” gave an owner of land
over which surface water flowed unlimited leeway in discharging that
surface water, whether the landowner discharged that water into a natural
watercourse or onto the land of another.22  The landowner could obstruct
overflow the banks of a stream, but which later find their way back into the stream
either by drainage or by percolation, as the stream subsides, are not deemed to be `flood
waters' . . . but are considered as waters of the stream.”  Id.  This Comment does not
address “flood waters.”
20. See 4 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 977 (8th ed. 1987), where
flood waters are described as the “common enemy” of all landowners.  See also
Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 95, 196 P. 25, 30 (1921).  The court in Weinberg
Co. stated:
The doctrine of the common law relating to protection against flood overflow
of rivers, and which has been adopted by the California courts, recognizes
such flood waters as a common enemy which may be guarded against or
warded off by one whose property is invaded or threatened, by obstructions
which are merely defensive in their nature and not calculated to interfere with
the current of the water in its natural channel . . . even though the result of
such obstruction has been to throw an increased volume of the flood upon
opposite or lower proprietors.
Id.  Ostensibly, the common enemy doctrine still controls in flood water cases. 
Nevertheless, the protective measures must still be reasonable.  Id. at 96, 196 P. at 30;
see also Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 P. 825 (1930).  The court in Le Brun
stated:  “[flood waters] are regarded as `a common enemy against which every man has
a right to defend himself, regardless of the fact that the barriers he erects for the
protection of his land may cause the flood to rise higher, or flow with greater force upon
his neighbors.'”  Id. at 314, 291 P. at 827.  See generally WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE
CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 28 (1956).
21. This Comment, however, does not question the rules concerning liability for
the diversion of “flood waters,” nor does it question at what moment “surface waters”
that have entered  a “natural watercourse” during heavy rain become “flood waters.” 
But see Mogle v. Moore, 16 Cal. 2d 1, 104 P.2d 785 (1940), where “flood waters” are
distinguished from “surface waters” by the fact that flood waters are those that have
broken away from a stream, while surface waters are those that have yet to become part
of a watercourse.  Id. at 9, 104 P.2d at 790.
22. Town of Union v. Durkes, 38 N.J.L. 21, 22 (1875).  In this New Jersey case,
the court stated the common law:  “[T]he diversion of surface water, even when such a
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the flow of the water by turning it back or diverting it onto the land of
another without liability for any damage that might result.23  It was
damnum absque injuria.24  This rather harsh common law rule is no longer
followed with respect to surface waters or waters flowing within a natural
watercourse.25
Instead, more than a century ago, California adopted what is known as
the civil law rule.26  This rule gave the owner of the higher land an
easement or servitude over lower parcels which allowed him to discharge
surface waters, without liability, as they naturally flowed from his higher
land onto the lower land of another.27  The lower land owner could not
obstruct the water flow28 and had to accept it as the burden of natural
diversion [does] a hurt to another, [is] not an actionable wrong . . . . [S]urface water [is]
the common enemy, which every proprietor may fight and get rid of as best he may.” 
Id.
23. Id.  In Town of Union, the city graded a hillside and constructed a road.  This
improvement caused surface water to do damage to the land of the plaintiff  “by
washing away the soil.”  Id. at 21.
24. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (5th ed. 1979).  “Loss, hurt, or harm
without injury in the legal sense . . . .  A loss which does not give rise to an action for
damages against the person causing it.”  Id.
25. But see supra note 20.  The common enemy doctrine may still apply to
extraordinary overflows of streams or rivers, i.e., flood waters.
26. Ogburn v. Connor, 46 Cal. 346 (1873).  In Ogburn, Connor, a farmer, was the
lower land owner.  Ogburn, also a farmer, owned the upper land.  Connor, to protect his
soil from the natural surface water runoff from the Ogburn farm, built an embankment
at the property line.  Heavy rain fell and water collected on the Ogburn farm causing
damage.  The trial court held that the “common enemy” doctrine applied and denied
relief to Ogburn.  The Court of Appeal reversed holding:
[T]he owner of the lower ground has no right to erect embankments
whereby the natural flow of the water from the upper ground shall be stopped;
nor has the owner of the upper ground a right to make any excavations or
drains by which the flow of water is diverted from its natural channel and a
new channel be made on the lower ground . . . .
Id. at 351.
See Le Brun v. Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 P. 825 (1930), for a case which applies
the civil law rule to surface waters.  See Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19,
119 P.2d 1 (1941), for a case which applies the civil law rule to watercourses.
27. E.g., Le Brun, 210 Cal. 308, 291 P. 825.  The court stated:
It is thoroughly settled in California that the owner of the upper or dominant
estate has a legal and natural easement or servitude in the lower or servient
estate to discharge all surface waters naturally falling or accumulating on his
land, upon or over the land of the servient owner in the manner in which they
would naturally flow from a higher to a lower level, and that the owner of the
lower estate is answerable in damages for any injury which may be caused to
the upper estate by reason of obstructions which he has placed in the way of
such natural flow, thus causing it to back up or remain on the land of the
upper proprietor.
Id. at 313, 291 P. at 828.
 28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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drainage.29  The uphill owner, however, was not permitted to gather the
surface waters by artificial means and discharge them onto the lower land
in greater volume or in a different manner than they would have been
discharged naturally.30  Note that with respect to “surface waters,” the civil
law rule, as opposed to the common law rule, exposed the upper landowner
to liability and deprived him of his common law immunity.31
As to water flowing within a natural watercourse, however, the civil law
rule differed.  It solidified the upper landowner's common law immunity
from liability for water discharge.32  Nowhere is a rationale given for this
 29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal.
2d 396, 402, 412 P.2d 529, 532, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (1966).  The court noted that the
civil law rule “finds its justification in the concept that those purchasing or otherwise
acquiring land should expect and be required to accept it subject to the burdens of
natural drainage.”  Id.
30. San Gabriel V.C.C. v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 398, 188 P. 544,
548 (1920).  The court stated that as to surface waters “the [civil law] rule has been
established by numerous decisions in this state that a landowner may not gather them
together on his land by artificial means and discharge them onto the lower lying land in
greater volume or in a different manner than they would naturally be discharged.”  Id.
See, e.g., Larrabee v. Town of Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 63 P. 143 (1900).  The court
in Larrabee held an upper landowner liable for damages caused by the diversion of
water that ran at the edge of a sidewalk that abutted plaintiff's property.  The court
found it unnecessary to determine whether the water, which ran approximately eighteen
inches deep and three feet wide, constituted a natural watercourse because diversion of
any kind of water (excluding flood water) from its natural drainage path gave rise to
liability under the civil law rule.  Id. at 99, 63 P. at 145.
But see Turner v. Hopper, 83 Cal. App. 2d 215, 188 P.2d 257 (1948).  The court held
that a defendant who reformed a swale that was 250 feet wide and turned it into a ditch
that was 20 feet wide was not liable for any damage caused by surface water flowing
through the ditch.  The court held that the alteration was not a sufficient change in the
natural conditions to warrant a cause of action.  Id. at 218, 188 P.2d at 259.  The court
found that the ditch was shallower than the swale, that the water that ran through the
swale usually ran through the bottom twenty feet anyway, and that the outlet for the
water was in a similar location as it had been with the swale.  Id.
 31. An example may be instructive:  Assume an upper landowner, the city of San
Diego, builds a road with gutters designed to carry water away from its development. 
During a rain storm surface water is carried by the road to the downhill land of the
plaintiff where it floods his house.  Without the road the surface water would have
flowed over the surface of the land and nowhere near plaintiff's home.
The common enemy doctrine would have immunized the city of San Diego for
liability for such damage.  The civil law rule would expose the city of San Diego to
liability because its actions caused surface water to be gathered and discharged in a
different manner than it would have naturally.
32. Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 349, 867 P.2d 724, 738, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d. 613, 632 (1994).  The court defined the civil law rule as applied to
watercourses:  “[A]n upper riparian owner had the right . . . to discharge surface waters,
including those whose volume was increased as a result of development which altered
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difference; rather, it is deemed “well settled.”33  Under the civil law natural
watercourse rule, an upper riparian34 owner could collect or gather surface
waters and discharge them into a natural watercourse at a location or
locations other than those where natural runoff would normally have
occurred even if that watercourse was incapable of accommodating the
increased flow of water.35  It was immaterial that the watercourse was
inadequate to accommodate the increased flow,36 or that downstream land
might be flooded as a result of this increased flow, as long as the surface
water was discharged into a natural watercourse.37  Therefore, if surface
waters were gathered and discharged into a stream which was part of a
both the absorption of waters by the soil and the drainage pattern, into a natural
watercourse.”  Id.  See, e.g., O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 19
Cal. 2d 61, 119 P.2d 23 (1941).  The plaintiff in O'Hara alleged that the county flood
control district replaced low permeable dikes that bordered a river with certain
improvements constructed for flood control.  The improvements, allegedly, increased
the velocity of water flowing in the river and obstructed drainage of surface waters into
the river.  During a rainstorm, the plaintiff's land was flooded by surface waters that
could not drain into the river and by water that burst through the river banks.  Id. at 64,
119 P.2d at 25.  The court held that “[a] lower riparian owner has no redress for injury
to his land caused by improvements in the stream when there has been no diversion of
water out of its natural channel.”  Id. at 63, 119 P.2d at 24.  Therefore, the plaintiff's
complaint did not state a cause of action.  Id.
33. See infra notes 35, 49, and accompanying text.
34. A riparian owner is one who owns land alongside a river.  Bathgate v. Irvine,
126 Cal. 135, 58 P. 442 (1899).  A river, of course, is considered a natural watercourse.
35. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 349, 867 P.2d at 738, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632; see, e.g.,
Deckert v. County of Riverside, 115 Cal. App. 3d 885, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 870.  The court
in Deckert held that a shopping center developer who rerouted surface water through an
underground pipe that drained into a natural watercourse was not liable for the flooding
that occurred to a downstream property even though the surface water flowing through
the pipe added to the volume and velocity within the watercourse.  Id. at 895, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 870.  The court stated:
These facts call into application a well settled principle of law found in the
flooding cases.  It is that an upper landowner who collects surface waters and
discharges them into a natural watercourse, one into which such surface
waters naturally drain, then the upper landowner is not liable to the lower
landowner for any damages arising from the increased volume of water
flowing in and along the natural watercourse.
Id. 
36. San Gabriel V.C.C. v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 401, 188 P. 554,
559 (1920).  “[A] riparian owner has no right to complain because the volume of water
in the stream is increased by artificially draining surface waters into it above, provided
only the stream is the natural drainage channel for the lands so drained.”  Id.  
37. Id.  See, e.g.,  Youngblood v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 2d 481, 325
P.2d 587 (1958).  The court held that a developer who subdivided uphill land was not
liable for any damage below because the subdivision did not “divert the natural drainage
flow at all.  It merely increased and accelerated it through creating a greater runoff.”  Id.
at 492, 325 P.2d at 592.  But cf. Smith v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 2d 562, 153
P.2d 69 (1944).  The court in Smith noted the civil law watercourse rule, but held that
the city had not simply increased the flow within the watercourse but, rather had
actually diverted the natural flow.  Id. at 577, 153 P.2d at 82.  A landowner is liable for
the diversion of a natural watercourse.  Id.
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natural drainage path and those surface waters flowed to the land below
only as a part of the stream, a lower landowner harmed by the addition of
those surface waters could not complain.38
Based on this, the courts went on to say that since a riparian owner could
not complain when surface waters were actually added by artificial
drainage to the volume of a stream, then riparian owners could not
complain about drainage improvements39 that did not add water to the
stream but merely protected the adjoining land against the water already
in the stream.40  Again, it made no difference whether the stream could
accommodate any increase in the volume and velocity of water within the
watercourse as a result of the improvements.41
The civil law watercourse rule42 allowed the uphill riparian owner to
improve the natural drainage channel at the expense of his downhill
neighbor.43  The owner could straighten the stream or improve its bed with
paving, drains, or conduits.  The upper landowner could also construct
38. See supra note 32.
39. Improvements might include concrete embankments, bulkheads, culverts,
dikes, ditches.
40. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 19 Cal. 2d 61,
119 P.2d 23 (1941).  The court held that a defendant who had replaced permeable dikes
with concrete levees and concrete embankments running at right angles to the levees
was not liable for the damage caused due to the increase in velocity and volume of
water within the watercourse.  Id. at 62, 119 P.2d at 24.  Compare San Gabriel V.C.C.,
182 Cal. at 404, 188 P. at 558, where the court recognized that in some cases where the
velocity and volume of water running through a stream was increased due to
improvements, the activities were enjoined or damages granted.  In those cases,
however, “factors other than those merely of a change reasonably made for the
protection of land above and having the effect only of increasing the volume and to that
extent the speed and height of the water [were present].”  Id.  The court pointed in
particular to a case where the increased flow might also include raw sewage or some
other type of pollution.  Id.
41. San Gabriel V.C.C., 182 Cal. at 406, 188 P. at 560.
42. The civil law watercourse rule is often referred to in the case law simply as
the natural watercourse rule.  See Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 349, 867
P.2d 724, 745, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 613, 655 (1994).
43. Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 283, 289 P.2d 1, 5 (1955).  In
Bauer, the county of Ventura built a system of ditches and levees which diverted water
from its natural watercourse onto Bauer's lower land.  The court affirmed the civil law
rule as to watercourses:  “Mere improvement within an existing watercourse which
accelerates rather than diverts the flow does not give rise to a cause of action when
damage results from an overflow. . . .  But to escape liability the improvements thus
described must follow the natural drainage of the country or the natural stream.”  Id.
Here, however, the court found that liability could follow from the County's activities
because it had actually altered the natural watercourse.  Therefore, the court reversed
the trial court's ruling sustaining the defendant's demurrer.  Id.
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dikes or bulkheads.  Again, this could be done even if the result was to
increase the volume and velocity of the water within the watercourse to the
detriment of lower owners.44
Archer v. City of Los Angeles45 solidified the civil law watercourse rule
in California.  In Archer, the plaintiff was a downhill landowner.  The
Archers lived on a lagoon that drained into the Pacific Ocean.  The
defendant uphill landowner was the City of Los Angeles.46  In developing
the uphill land, the city deepened, widened, and paved the existing natural
drainage into the lagoon.  The concrete improvements increased the
volume and velocity of the water flowing into the lagoon.47  Following
heavy rain, the lagoon swelled, flooding the plaintiff's property up to nine
feet in places.  The outlet of the lagoon which led to the Pacific Ocean was
not wide enough to accommodate the increased flow of water into the
lagoon.  In effect, the lagoon backed up.48
  The court held that a lower landowner had no right of redress for injury
caused to his land by improvements to a stream for the purpose of draining
or protecting the land above.49  The court was indifferent to the damage
44. Id.
45. 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941).
46. Many of the cases which arise in this context contain an inverse condemnation
allegation based on Art. I Sec. 19 of the California Constitution.  This Comment does
not directly address that issue.  The California Supreme Court, however, has stated “that
a government entity may, if it acts unreasonably, be liable in inverse condemnation for
damage caused by its discharge of surface water runoff from property which it
improved into a natural watercourse.”  Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 362, 867 P.2d at 750, 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 645.  Thus a government entity can be found liable in inverse
condemnation under either the Keys rule or the Locklin rule if its activities are
unreasonable.  See also Arvo Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation:  Unintended
Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 431, 448 (1969) (discussing the possibility of
inverse condemnation in surface water and flood water cases); cf. Bunch v. Coachella
Valley Water Dist., 214 Cal. App. 3d 203, 262 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1989) (holding that a
government entity may be liable in inverse condemnation for flood control activities
which result in unintended physical property damage only where there is a conjunction
of substantial causation and unreasonableness).
47. Archer, 19 Cal. 2d at 29, 119 P.2d at 13.  This occurred because the water
flowed faster on the concrete and could not be absorbed into the soil.  Id.
48. This, however, was not a flood water case.  Recall that flood water cases arise
when defendants have deflected floodwater from their land onto the land of another
causing damage.  The City of Los Angeles in Archer did not deflect flood water; it
simply increased the flow of stream water within the natural watercourse.  Id.
49. Id. at 24, 119 P.2d at 5.  The court stated:
It is established in California and other jurisdictions that a lower owner has no
right of redress for injury to his land caused by improvements made in the
stream for the purpose of draining or protecting the land above, even though
the channel is inadequate to accommodate the increased flow of water
resulting from the improvements.
Id.  The court then cited San Gabriel V.C.C. v. County of Los Angeles as authority for
its holding.  Id.
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done to the lower land.50  This civil law rule was the law in California until
the modern rule of reasonableness began to erode it.
2. The Modern Rule of Reasonableness
The modern trend in water law seems to be away from the rigidities of
property law and toward the flexible standards of tort law.51  First, the
California Supreme Court instituted a rule of reasonableness to govern
surface water discharge cases.52  The court then applied a rule of
reasonableness to cases involving natural watercourses.53  Under the civil
50. Id. at 25, 119 P.2d at 5.  The court stated:  “[T]he construction of
improvements by the defendants in the instant case did not place upon them the duty of
improving the outlet [of the lagoon].  They cannot be held negligent for doing what they
had a right to do even though a different plan might have avoided the damage.”  Id.
51. See Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 351, 867 P.2d 724, 738, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613, 630
(1994).  The court stated:
The modern rule governing landowner liability for surface water runoff and
drainage is no longer simply a rule of property law dependent upon the
existence of rights, servitudes, or easements.  . . . Today a landowner's
conduct in using or altering the property in a manner which affects the
discharge of surface waters onto adjacent property is subject to a test of
reasonableness.
Id.
The Locklin court then went on to extend the rule of reasonableness to watercourse
cases.  Compare the rule in Locklin with the rule in Archer, supra note 49; see also
Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966) (the court
instituted the rule of reasonableness to surface water cases).  See infra note 123 for other
jurisdictions instituting the rule of reasonableness.
52. Keys, 64 Cal. 2d. at 409, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 288; see infra notes
56-66 and accompanying text.  Briefly, the Keys court held that it was “incumbent upon
every person to take reasonable care in using his property to avoid injury to adjacent
property through the flow of surface waters.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Keys court
also stated:
There is no question . . . that one's liability for  interfering with surface
waters, when incurred, is a tort liability.  An unjustified invasion of a
possessor's interest in the use and enjoyment of his land through the medium
of surface waters, or any other type of waters, is as much a tort as a trespass or
a private nuisance produced by smoke or smells.
Such words as “right,” “servitude,” and “easement” connote a state that is
fixed and definite, and they cannot be applied in those terms to describe
flexible legal relations dependent upon varying circumstances . . . .  [A] court
is more likely to produce an acceptable result if it analyzes “prerequisites of
liability” rather than merely the “rights of the parties.”
Id. at 407, 412 P.2d at 536, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
53. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 337, 867 P.2d at 729, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.  The court
stated:
We conclude that Archer does not correctly state the principles presently
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law rule, surface water could not be indiscriminately dumped on the land
of another if not channeled into a natural watercourse.54  The upper owner
had an easement over only that portion of land through which surface
water naturally drained.  Since development of uphill land necessarily
directed surface water in “new,” i.e., unnatural, paths, this rule almost
always exposed the developing uphill landowner to liability.  In this way,
the civil law rule created a disincentive to development, a disincentive that
concerned the court.55
With the landmark case of Keys v. Romley,56 the court altered the civil
law rule.  By instituting a rule of reasonableness to surface water cases, the
court sought to enhance incentives to develop57 as well as to promote
equity as between the parties.58
In Keys, the Keys' were the downhill landowners.  Romley leased the
uphill property.59  In 1956, Keys built an appliance store on his land and
in so doing he piled a mound of loose dirt at the back of his property.  In
1957, Romley graded the uphill land, built an ice rink, and paved a parking
lot with asphalt.  In 1958, Keys removed the loose dirt pile which abutted
the Romley property.  In 1959, the Keys property was flooded by “surface
water” runoff from the Romley property.60
The court in Keys found that a landowner's conduct in using or altering
the property in a manner which affects the discharge of surface waters onto
an adjacent property is subject to a test of reasonableness:
It is . . . incumbent upon every person to take reasonable care in using his
property to avoid injury to adjacent property through the flow of surface waters. 
applicable to the liability of riparian owners . . . .
When alterations or improvements on upstream property discharge an
increased volume of surface water into a natural watercourse, and the
increased volume and/or velocity of the stream waters or the method of
discharge into the watercourse causes downstream property damage . . . a
property owner may be liable for that damage.  The test is whether, under all
the circumstances, the upper landowner's conduct was reasonable.
Id. (emphasis added).
54. San Gabriel V.C.C. v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 398, 188 P. 544,
548 (1920); see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
55. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 402, 412 P.2d 529, 533, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273,
280 (1966).  The court stated:  “The civil law rule, if strictly applied, admittedly has
some tendency to inhibit improvement of land.”  Id.
56. 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966).
57. Id. at 409, 412 P.2d at 539, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 289.  The court stated that the
California rule announced in Keys “encourages profitable and enjoyable use of
property.”  Id.  See also infra note 85 and accompanying text.
58. Id.  The court stated:  “No party, whether an upper or lower landowner, may
act arbitrarily and unreasonably in his relations with other landowners and still be
immunized from liability.”  Id.
59. The uphill land owner was also named as a defendant, but it was Romley who
actually improved the land in question thereby creating the drainage problem.
60. Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 400, 412 P.2d at 530, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
648
G   C:\WP51\DOCS\LAWREVIE\32-2\BOOK\LENAIN.FMT Wed, 24-Oct-18  09:34 am   G
[VOL. 32: 637, 1995] Surface Waters in California
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Failure to exercise reasonable care may result in liability by an upper to a lower
landowner.  It is equally the duty of any person threatened with injury to his
property by the flow of surface waters to take reasonable precautions to avoid or
reduce any actual or potential injury.61
The notion of servitudes was eliminated.  However, this is not a strict
negligence standard.62  This rule of reasonableness is reciprocal, and
includes a balancing of the utility of the use with the actual gravity of the
harm.  Both lower and upper landowners are encouraged to act
reasonably.63  If the lower landowner behaves unreasonably in accepting
the changed flow of water, he loses even if the changed flow was the result
of unreasonable activity.64  For example, in Keys, the court expressed
reservations that Mr. Keys, by removing the pile of loose dirt from the
back of his property, had acted unreasonably.  The court posited that the
dirt pile might have protected the Keys property from surface water flow
61. Id. at 409, 412 P.2d at 535, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (emphasis added).
62. Cf. Marment v. Castlewood Country Club, 30 Cal. App. 3d 483, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 853 (1973).  In Marment, the defendants installed a drainage system which picked
up both surface and sub-surface water, and deposited it at the edge of plaintiff's
property.  Soon after, plaintiff's land began to slip, the movement ultimately resulting in
substantial, if not total, loss of plaintiff's homes.  The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants.  The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, stating:  “[T]he upper owner
must act reasonably to avoid, and the lower owner to protect against, injury to the lower
land through diversion of the flow of water.  If both act reasonably, then the upper
owner is liable.”  Id. at 485, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
The Court of Appeal remanded because the trial court instructed the jury as to strict
negligence accountability whereas the Keys rule required a test of reasonableness which
weighs “the utility of the diversion against the gravity of the harm . . . .”  Id.
63. See, e.g., Pagliotti v. Acquistapace, 64 Cal. 2d 873, 412 P.2d 538, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 282 (1966).  The court found that an uphill owner who constructed 48 apartment
units on his property and who paved a parking area such that natural surface water flow
was altered had acted reasonably because the uphill owner had no alternative means of
disposing of his surface water.  At the same time, in accordance with Keys, the court
remanded the case for a determination of the reasonableness of the lower landowner
who had erected a dam to stop the surface waters from entering her property.  Id.
64. This result is implicit in the Keys decision.  The Keys rule requires an inquiry
into the reasonableness of uphill as well as downhill landowners.  See Keys, 64 Cal. 2d
at 409, 412 P.2d at 536-37, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 280-81.  If the uphill landowner's liability
was contingent on his unreasonable, i.e., negligent conduct alone, an inquiry into the
reasonableness of the downhill owner would be unnecessary.  In this way, the rule
functions much the same as a contributory negligence rule would.
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from the Romley property.65  Accordingly, the  court remanded the case for
a finding on the issue of reasonableness.66
The Keys rule, when it was announced, applied only to surface water
cases.  As to watercourse cases, the civil law watercourse rule was still
being followed.67  Case law, however, slowly evolved to also apply a rule
of reasonableness to watercourse situations.68  In Ektelon v. City of San
Diego,69 a private developer and the City of San Diego altered uphill land
by making various improvements to the natural drainage system.  This
increased the velocity and volume of flow within the watercourse and
caused damage to the downstream landowners.70  These facts are analogous
to Archer,71 but the court did not follow the rule announced in Archer. 
Rather, the court held that Keys had created “a broad rule of
reasonableness to be applied to all factual situations.”72  The Ektelon court
went on to say that “[a]n upstream landowner has no absolute right to
protect his land from floodwaters by constructing structures which increase
the downstream flow of water into its natural watercourse, but is instead
65. Id. at 411, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 288.  “The injuries complained of
only began to occur here after plaintiffs removed the dirt pile from the rear of their
property and the defendants changed the contours of their own property.  These acts
must be weighed, and the court should make a finding on the issue of reasonableness.” 
Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Deckert v. County of Riverside, 115 Cal. App. 3d 885, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 865 (1981) (applying the civil law watercourse rule in 1981, fifteen years after the
imposition of the rule of reasonableness in Keys).
68. See, e.g., Martinson v. Hughey, 199 Cal. App. 3d 318, 244 Cal. Rptr. 795
(1988).  Martinson was the upper landowner.  Hughey was the lower landowner.  A
drainage ditch ran along the border of Martinson's property and emptied into a ditch
running along the northern border of Hughey's property.  Martinson deepened and
widened the ditch within his property that fed the ditch that ran along Hughey's
property.  Hughey began to obstruct the ditch with dirt, debris, tires and concrete pieces,
complaining that the improvements had caused an increased flow of water which he did
not have to accept.  The drainage water backed up and damaged some of the trees on the
Martinson land.  Rather than applying the civil law watercourse rule and finding
Martinson within his right for deepening and widening the ditch, the court followed the
rule of reasonableness outlined in Keys to determine whether the parties had acted
reasonably.  The court determined that Martinson's actions were reasonable and that
Hughey's were not.  See also Weaver v. Bishop 206 Cal. App. 3d 1351, 254 Cal. Rptr.
425 (1988).  Bishop constructed a riprap along a stream bank to stop the erosion of his
property.  This in turn caused more erosion to occur to the Weaver property which was
on the other side of the stream.  Weaver said that Bishop had actually diverted the
watercourse and was automatically liable.  The court found that Bishop had simply
improved the watercourse and therefore liability would turn on the reasonableness of the
parties.
69. 200 Cal. App. 3d 804, 246 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1988).
70. Id. at 807, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
71. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
72. Ektelon, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
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governed by the ordinary principles of negligence.”73  As this trend picked
up momentum, the definitional differences between surface waters and
waters flowing through a natural watercourse seemed to be abandoned.74 
Finally, the California Supreme Court officially extended the rule of
reasonableness followed in cases such as Ektelon to the watercourse
scenario.75
In Locklin v. City of Lafayette, Harry Locklin was the downhill plaintiff. 
Locklin lived along a creek.  The City of Lafayette and several private
developers made various improvements76 to the creek bed, thereby
increasing the velocity and volume of water within it.  This increase in
velocity and volume of water caused a steady erosion of Locklin's
property.  The court agreed with Ektelon and overruled Archer.77  In doing
so the court stated:  “There is no exception to the rule of reasonableness for
riparians.  No logic would support such a distinction and we decline to
recognize one.”78
Thus, under the current state of the law in this area, the Keys rule applies
in surface water cases, and the Locklin rule applies in watercourse cases.
73. Id. at 810, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
74. 5 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE § 14:23, at 357 (2d ed. 1989).  The author stated:
It seems reasonable to assume the former . . . rule applicable to the use of
natural watercourses has been modified by the `reasonable use' test applicable
to surface waters.  With the introduction of this test there is no longer any
valid reason for distinguishing between surface waters and those that flow
through a natural watercourse with respect to the rights and obligations of the
respective property owners.
Id.
75. Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 357, 867 P.2d 724, 742, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 613, 631 (1994).
76. Id. at 341, 867 P.2d at 731, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620.  These improvements
included paving the stream bed, building concrete embankments for flood control, and
inserting concrete culverts in the stream bed.  Id.
77. Id. at 337, 867  P.2d at 730, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623.  See the text
accompanying note 2, supra, for the holding of Locklin; see also supra note 51.  The
court also stated:  “Since there was no issue involving unreasonable conduct in draining
surface waters into the stream bed in Archer, that decision also fails to support a
conclusion that immunity exists regardless of whether the upstream owner acted
reasonably.”  Id. at 347, 867 P.2d at 735, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624 (internal citations
omitted).
78. Id. at 357, 867 P.2d at 742, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.
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III. THE THREE POLICY CONCERNS
In moving to the rule of reasonableness, courts have attempted to
balance two conflicting policies: maintaining the incentive to develop
uphill land while insuring the downhill landowner's right to compensation
for damage to his land caused by the uphill development.  There is,
however, a third policy concern that warrants the court's attention: the
promotion of overall economic efficiency.
The parties should be encouraged in all cases to seek the most cost
efficient solutions to any problem causing damage.  The cost efficient
solution conserves resources and often results in prophylactic measures. 
This Comment suggests that parties should be given the proper incentives
to abate potential damage when it is less expensive to do so, and that the
rules espoused in Keys and Locklin may fail to provide such an incentive.
A. Incentive to Develop
For the last one hundred years, the courts have been unequivocal about
their desire to promote development in the area of water flow law.79  The
early rules covering the runoff of surface waters onto adjacent property and
into natural watercourses were, in fact, designed to accommodate
“progression from a rural, agricultural society to gradual urbanization.”80 
Originally, the common law “common enemy doctrine” granted uphill
owners total immunity from liability regardless of how they discharged
water or how the discharged water was classified.  This rule allowed uphill
landowners to develop without restriction.
The civil law natural watercourse rule was a pro-development rule as
well.81  In fact, as discussed above it had two aspects.  The first allowed
uphill owners to gather as much surface water as they wanted and to
discharge it into natural watercourses without repercussion.  The second
allowed uphill owners to improve drainage by constructing embankments
on dikes within the boundaries of the actual watercourse even if those
79. See, e.g., Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 867 P.2d 724, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (1994);
Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal 2d. 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1966); Archer v. City
of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d. 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941); O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood
Control Dist., 19 Cal. 2d. 61, 119 P.2d 23 (1941); San Gabriel V.C.C. v. Los Angeles,
182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554 (1920); Larrabee v. Town of Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 63 P.
143 (1900).
80. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 351, 867 P.2d at 737, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
81. Archer, 19 Cal. 2d at 27, 119 P.2d at 6.  The court stated:  “Not to permit an
upper landowner to protect his land against the stream would be in many instances to
destroy the possibility of making the land available for improvement or settlement and
condemn it to sterility and vacancy.”  Id. (quoting San Gabriel V.C.C. v. Los Angeles
County, 182 Cal. 392, 401, 188 P. 554, 588 (1920)).
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improvements increased the velocity and volume of the water within the
watercourse to the detriment of the lower landowners.  Both of these
aspects of the watercourse rule were designed to facilitate the development
of upstream properties.82
The civil law surface water rule, however, worked in reverse by
exposing upper landowners to absolute liability for non-natural discharges
of surface water.83  It was a potential disincentive to development.  The
Keys rule of reasonableness in effect tilted the scales away from automatic
compensation for damaged lower landowners.84  This result was more
amenable to development.85  The theory, of course, has always been that
by eliminating, or at least decreasing, the probability of liability for
82. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 351, 867 P.2d at 738, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.  The court
stated:
[T]he natural watercourse rule has two aspects.  The first permits the riparian
landowner to gather surface waters and discharge them into the watercourse at
a location other than that at which natural drainage would occur.  The second
permits the owner to make improvements in the bed of the stream to improve
drainage and to protect the land from erosion by constructing dikes or
embankments even though the result may be increased flow and velocity
which might damage the property of lower riparian owners.  Both aspects of
the rule have as their purpose facilitating the development of upstream
properties.
Id.
83. Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 402, 412 P.2d at 532, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 277.  The court
noted that “[t]he civil law rule, if strictly applied, admittedly has some tendency to
inhibit improvement of land, since almost any use of the property is likely to cause a
change in the natural drainage which may justify complaint by an adjoining
landowner.”  Id. 
84. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.  The court in Keys stated:  “It
is equally the duty of any person threatened with injury to his property by the flow of
surface waters to take reasonable precautions to avoid or reduce any actual or potential
injury.”  Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 409, 412 P.2d at 536, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
85. The Keys court also reasoned that because the utility of the possessor's use of
the land was entered into the reasonableness calculus and balanced against the harm
caused by that use, truly meritorious uphill development would not be significantly
deterred.  Id. at 410, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. 281.  The court stated:
The gravity of the harm is its seriousness from an objective viewpoint, while
the utility of conduct is its meritoriousness from the same viewpoint.  If the
weight is on the side of him who alters the natural [flow of water], then he has
acted reasonably and without liability; if the harm to the lower landowner is
unreasonably severe, then the economic costs incident to the expulsion of
surface waters must be borne by the upper owner whose development caused
the damage.
Id.  (internal citation omitted)
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damaging water flow caused by uphill development, that that very
development would be encouraged.86
B. Downhill Landowner's Right to Compensation
More important than development, however, was that each property
owner be encouraged to act reasonably with respect to one another, and
that equitable results follow damage.87  The Keys court stated that the
issues to be contemplated should arise under tort law rather than under
property law88 because tort law afforded more flexibility on a case by case
basis and avoided the often harsh results of the civil law rule.89  To the
86. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 360, 867 P.2d at 744, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.  The court
stated:
The purpose of both the civil law rule creating immunity for damage caused
by surface water runoff onto adjacent property and the natural watercourse
rule which imposed the burden of damage caused by upstream development
on the downstream owner was to ensure that development of property would
not be foreclosed by imposition of liability for damage caused by changes in
the treatment of surface water occasioned by development.  Keys v. Romley
and the application of the rule of reasonableness to natural watercourses
further that purpose.  The rules applicable to surface water runoff onto
adjacent property or into a natural watercourse have been modified only by
limiting the immunity created by the civil and common law rules to conduct
that is reasonable.
Id.
87. Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 409, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281.  The court
stated:  “It is . . . incumbent upon every person to take reasonable care in using his
property to avoid injury to adjacent property through the flow of surface waters.  Failure
to exercise reasonable care may result in liability by an upper to a lower landowner.” 
Id.
88. Id. at 407, 412 P.2d at 536, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 280.  The court stated:
It has generally been assumed heretofore that the rules relative to surface
waters are a branch of property law.  This classification undoubtedly results
from the fact that most controversies over private waters arise between
adjoining landowners and nearly always involve invasions of interests in land
rather than interests in personalty or chattels.  The consequence is that the
legal relations of the parties have been stated almost invariably in terms of
property concepts, such as rights, privileges, servitudes, natural easements,
etc.
Id.
The court went on to conclude that “one's liability for interfering with surface waters
. . . is a tort liability.”  Id.
89. Id. at 407, 412 P.2d at 535, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 279.  The court stated:  “[T]he
civil law rule . . . may be unnecessarily rigid and occasionally unjust, particularly in
heavily developed areas.  It places the entire liability for damages on one owner on the
basis of the unvarying formula that he who changes conditions is liable.”  Id.  The court
went on to say:
But no rule can be applied by a court of justice with utter disregard for the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the parties and properties involved.  No
party, whether upper or lower landowner, may act arbitrarily and
unreasonably in his relations with other landowners and still be immunized
from all liability.
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Keys court, a pro-development policy was not so compelling as to warrant
a complete immunity from liability for uphill landowners.90  It seems that
it was more important that the results of any given case be fair and
equitable.
C. The Promotion of Overall Economic Efficiency
There is yet another policy concern which merits attention.  That policy
is the promotion of overall economic efficiency.91  At times this policy
concern actually seems implicit in the court's decisions,92 but no court in
this arena has expressly announced its importance.  Nevertheless, courts
should desire to promote solutions that do not waste resources.  The least
expensive remedy to a situation is, by definition, the most efficient. 
Perhaps more importantly, the least expensive remedy often turns out to be
a prophylactic measure.  Thus, the efficient remedy, which results in the
Id. at 408, 412 P.2d at 535, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
90. The Keys court, though taking notice of this possible disincentive, noted:
No documentation has been produced to establish that the [civil law] rule has
in fact impeded urban development in the state.  A number of highly
urbanized states follow the rule, and California's phenomenal growth rate, to
which no one can be oblivious and of which this court may take judicial
notice, appears unstunted by the existence and application of the civil law rule
since 1873.
Id. at 406, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 279, 412 P.2d at 535.
91. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).  For purposes of this Comment, efficiency will refer to the
relationship between the aggregate benefits of a situation and the aggregate
costs of the situation . . . .  [E]fficiency corresponds to `the size of the pie,'
while equity has to do with how it is sliced.  Economists traditionally
concentrate on how to maximize the size of the pie, leaving to others . . . the
decision [of] how to divide it.
Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
92. As will be discussed, the promotion of economic efficiency is fostered by a
clear delimitation of rights and a predictable outcome.  See infra note 104 and
accompanying text.  The Keys court noted that “[the civil law rule] has the advantage
that rights thereunder are readily predictable, and thus tends to avoid the contests likely
to occur under [other rules].”  Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 402, 412 P.2d at 532, 50 Cal. Rptr. at
279.
The Keys court also noted that a rule of reasonableness avoids “the harsh results
which occasionally may be reached under extreme applications of the other rules; but
since the rights of the parties are ordinarily regarded as involving issues of fact for the
jury, the predictability of result under the other rules may be lost.”  Id. at 403, 412 P.2d
at 533, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 277.  See generally RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET,
AND THE LAW (1988).
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least cost to society,93 often eliminates the possibility of injury altogether.94 
The parties should be encouraged to seek such efficient solutions.  A broad
rule of reasonableness, such as that announced in Keys or Locklin, may fail
to provide the incentive to do so.95
To create the proper incentives for parties to seek efficient solutions, the
most effective approach is the imposition of a bright line rule.96  A
hypothetical will be instructive:97  Suppose a private developer desired to
improve ten acres of land which straddled a drainage basin.  Before the
improvements, water had flowed through the basin year round as a stream,
but it flowed slowly and was never a threat to downhill property, even
during heavy rain.  After receiving approval from the city, the developer
graded the ten acres, poured foundations, paved streets, and in anticipation
of an increased need for drainage for her development, widened the
existing stream and poured concrete embankments for three hundred yards
on either side of the stream to facilitate it.
After a steady rain during the winter following completion of the
developer's project, a property one mile down the drainage basin that was
built along the stream was inundated, sustaining a total of $120,000 in
damages.  The stream below the portion which the developer widened and
reinforced was not adequate to handle the increased velocity and flow of
water caused by the uphill development.98  Further, it has been discovered
that by removing the concrete embankments, the velocity and flow will
decrease such that damage will be negligible.  The cost of removal is
estimated at $80,000.99
93. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 7 (3d ed. 1986). 
The author points out that a “social cost diminishes the wealth of society,” i.e., reduces
the size of the pie, whereas “a private cost merely rearranges that wealth,” i.e., alters the
size of the slices while leaving the overall size of the pie intact.  Id.
94. Damages might also include psychological and emotional injuries which are
not as easily quantifiable or recompensable;  a downhill land owner might be trapped in
his home, or at least, lose items in his home that have great sentimental value, as the
house fills with water from a river that did not have the capacity to hold the increase in
flow caused by the uphill landowner's development.
95. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
96. This idea is often referred to as the Coase Theorem:  If there are zero
transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of the choice of legal rule
as long as the outcome is readily predictable.  See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (2d ed. 1989).
97. The hypothetical is a watercourse hypothetical.  It should be noted that the
logic would be the same if the hypothetical laid out a surface water fact pattern.
98. As noted, an uphill development like this causes an increased flow of water
because a hard surface like concrete placed in the stream bed makes it more difficult, if
not impossible, for water to be absorbed into the ground.  Furthermore, smooth concrete
also causes the water to flow more quickly because it is unimpeded.
99. Further assume that removal of the concrete would not adversely affect the
developer's project.
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If an unrestricted right to develop exists, i.e., a bright line rule, the
downhill landowner has two choices after paying to remedy the initial
damage:100  1) risk paying $120,000 to clean up an equivalent mess the
next time, or 2) pay the developer between $80,000 and $120,000 to
remove the concrete embankment and the problem.101  The logical and
economically efficient solution would be to pay the developer to remove
the embankment.  On the other hand, if the developer is absolutely liable
for the damage she causes,102 the outcome will be no different.103  Because
the developer knows she must compensate the lower landowner for any
future damage she causes, she is given an incentive to seek the least
expensive solution.  Here, she would pay for the removal of the
embankment.
Thus, if a bright line rule exists, and is known to the parties,
economically efficient decision making should take place maximizing
wealth by keeping costs to a minimum.104  This might have the actual effect
of rearranging the rights as delineated by the courts, but as long as an
economically efficient solution is reached, this should not matter.  The
economic problem in all cases, posits Ronald Coase, is how to maximize
value, not to determine who is right and who is wrong.105
Unfortunately, at least from the economist's viewpoint, the courts have
expressly moved away from such bright line rules in an attempt to promote
equity, fairness, and reasonableness.106  The rule of reasonableness is not
100. It is important to note that this analysis assumes that transaction costs do not
exist.
101. This assumes that the downhill landowner can, in fact, afford all of this.  It
may be that the downhill owner for our purposes turns out to be the downhill owner's
insurance carrier.
102. It is more likely the uphill landowner's insurance carrier will be making these
payments, but this should not alter the calculus.  The insurance carrier simply steps into
the shoes of the uphill (or downhill) landowner.
103. Again, this analysis assumes that transactions costs do not exist.
104. COASE, supra note 92, at 119.  The author states:  “[I]f market transactions
were costless, all that matters (questions of equity apart) is that the rights of the various
parties should be well defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast.”  Id.
105. Id. at 114.  The author states:  “It is always possible to modify by transactions
on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights.  And, of course, if such market
transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it
would lead to an increase in the value of production.”  Id.
106. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 409, 412 P.2d 529, 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273,
281 (1966).  The Romley court stated:
Our [civil law] rule has the advantage of predictability, in that responsibility
for diversion of surface waters is fixed, all things being relatively equal.  On
the other hand, we cannot permit certainty of liability to be an excuse for
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a bright line rule which clearly delineates the rights and responsibilities of
the respective parties; rather, it creates uncertain questions of fact.107
IV. TOWARD A UNIVERSAL RULE
The Locklin court asserted, in extending the Keys rule to watercourse
cases, that the rules governing surface water cases and natural watercourse
cases should be merged because no plausible distinction can be made
distinguishing the two factual scenarios.108  Nevertheless, as will be seen,
the rules still differ, and each has a different impact on the three policy
concerns.  Ironically, the difference in the rules is based upon the
distinction between surface water and water running in a natural
watercourse.109  This Comment argues, as the Locklin court rightly stated,
the distinction between surface water and water flowing within a natural
watercourse should not exist, and that the rules should be effectively
merged into a universal rule governing all factual scenarios.
As will be demonstrated, the Locklin rule promotes the stated policy
objectives more effectively than the Keys rule.  This Comment
recommends that the Keys rule should be disregarded and that the Locklin
rule should be adopted for all factual scenarios.  This Comment also
suggests that the Locklin rule be altered such that liability for damage
caused by the unreasonable discharge of water onto the land of another be
joint and several liability.  Joint and several liability may replace some of
the incentive for uphill defendants to seek economically efficient solutions
to the problems they create.
A. The Locklin and Keys Rules and Their Differences
The two rules are reciprocal.  As stated above, the Keys court announced
that it would not tolerate unreasonable conduct by landowners.110  To
counter such immunized and unreasonable conduct, the Keys court altered
the civil law surface water rule111 in an effort to protect upper landowners
tolerating unreasonable conduct by any landowners in modern society,
whether they be upper or lower, urban or rural.
Id.
107. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
109. See supra part II.
110. Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 409, 412 P.2d at 536, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 280.  The court
stated:  “No party, whether an upper or a lower landowner, may act arbitrarily or
unreasonably in his relations with other landowners and still be immunized from all
liability.”  Id.
111. Recall that the civil law surface water rule imposed absolute liability on an
uphill landowner for any “unnatural” discharge of surface water onto the land of
another.
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from the unreasonable conduct of lower landowners.112  Concurrently, this
rule had the effect of promoting development.  Thus, under the Keys rule
today, as opposed to the outmoded civil law surface water rule, an upper
landowner is shielded from liability when a lower landowner acts
unreasonably.  This same result, unsurprisingly, is also reached under the
Locklin rule.
What happens, however, if both uphill and downhill landowners act
reasonably?  Under the Keys rule, the reasonable uphill landowner is
liable.113  Under the Locklin rule, the reasonable uphill landowner is not
liable.114  Curiously, in reaching the opposite results, both the Locklin court
and the Keys court reverted to the civil law rule for guidance.115  When
both parties are reasonable under the Keys rule, the upper landowner is
liable as he would have been under the civil law surface water rule.  When
both parties are reasonable under the Locklin rule, the upper landowner is
immune from liability as he would have been under the civil law
watercourse rule.  The difference in the outcome, then, rests on the fact that
the civil law rule, as discussed in Section II,116 treated surface water cases
112. Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 408, 412 P.2d at 536, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 280.  The court
stated:  “[T]he traditional civil law rule . . . has been accepted as the basis for
harmonious relations between neighboring landowners for the past century.  But no rule
can be applied by a court of justice with utter disregard for the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the parties and properties involved.”  Id.
113. Id. at 409, 412 P. 2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 280.  The Keys court stated:  “If
the actions of both the upper and lower landowners are reasonable, necessary, and
generally in accord with the foregoing, then the injury must necessarily be borne by the
upper landowner who changes a natural system of drainage, in accordance with our
traditional civil law rule.”  Id.
114. Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 360, 867 P.2d 724, 744, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 613, 633 (1994).  The court stated, “[I]f the upper [land]owner acts reasonably
. . . the lower riparian [land]owner must continue to accept the burden of damage caused
by the stream water.”  Id.
115. In Keys, the court stated:  “If the actions of both the upper and lower
landowners are reasonable, necessary, and generally in accord with the foregoing, then
the injury must necessarily be born by the upper landowner who changes a natural
system of drainage, in accordance with our traditional civil law rule.”  See Keys, 64
Cal. 2d at 409, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 273 (emphasis added).  In Locklin, the
court stated, “[T]he `well settled civil law rule' dictates a different result for riparian
owners than that applicable to upland owners . . . . The result will differ in disputes
between riparian owners, each of whom had acted reasonably.”  Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at
360, 867 P.2d at 744, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
116. See supra note 26-50 and accompanying text.
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differently from watercourse cases.  Oddly, this was a distinction the very
same court in Locklin stated could not be made and did not exist.117
The Locklin court stated that property owners could not disregard the
impact of their conduct whether they lived upstream or upslope.118  It
referred to a “nationwide trend” toward a merger of the rules governing
diffused surface water and those governing watercourses.119  In fact, the
Locklin court noted that the authority on which the court in Keys relied in
establishing the surface water rule of reasonableness was a watercourse
case, not a surface water case.120
Similarly, the court in Ektelon stated the Keys decision created a broad
rule of reasonableness to be applied to all factual situations.121  The
117. It may be that the court recognized the shortcomings inherent in the Keys rule
and attempted to mitigate them with its approach in Locklin.  The court could not
abrogate Keys on the facts before it in Locklin, but one wonders whether, with the
opportunity, the court might do just that.
118. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 353, 867 P.2d at 740, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629.  The court
stated:
Defendants, who assume that Keys v. Romley . . . does not apply to discharge
of surface water into a natural watercourse or to improvements in a natural
watercourse, offer no justification, other than the fact that they might incur
liability, for recognizing a distinction between the duty of a riparian property
owner to avoid injury to downstream property owners, and the duty of an
uphill owner to downhill owners.  We do not share the assumption that either
a private or public property owner may disregard the impact of its conduct on
the other properties whether those properties are downstream or downslope.
Id.  (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 356, 867 P.2d at 742, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.  The court stated: 
“Weaver v. Bishop, Ektelon v. City of San Diego, and Martinson v. Hughey, . . . reflect
the nationwide trend toward merger of the rules governing diffused surface water and
those governing watercourses.”  Id. (citing A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
AND RESOURCES § 305(1), at 3-14 - 3-15 (1993) (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 356, 867 P.2d at 742, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631;  see Armstrong v. Francis
Corp., 120 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1956).  The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded:  “Social
progress and wellbeing are in actuality better served by a just and right balancing of the
competing interests according to the general principles of fairness and common sense
which attend the application of the rule of reason.”  Id. at 10.
 121.   Ektelon v. City of San Diego, 200 Cal. App. 3d 804, 808, 246 Cal. Rptr. 483
(1988).  The court stated:  “The court in Keys, after an extensive review of water law,
postulated a broad rule of reasonableness to be applied to all factual situations.”  Id.
(emphasis added).  See also Martinson v. Hughey, 199 Cal. App. 3d 318, 244 Cal. Rptr.
795 (1988) (assuming that reasonableness applied to natural watercourse cases); Weaver
v. Bishop, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1351, 254 Cal Rptr. 425 (1988).  The court in Weaver held
that neither the natural watercourse rule giving uphill owners absolute immunity for
improving a natural watercourse nor the “common enemy doctrine” which both fall
under the rubric damnum absque injuria should be applicable.  Id. at 1357, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 431.  The court stated:
[The notion of harm without legal injury is] peculiar to water law [and rests]
on the `generally perceived reasonableness' of actions taken to protect one's
property and on a policy of encouraging the preservation of land resources. 
However the nearly unanimous trend has been away from per se rules based
on categorical judgments of `generally perceived reasonableness,' and toward
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conclusion reached by the Locklin court in extending the Keys rule to the
natural watercourse case was this:
[W]e agree with those courts which have held that Keys v. Romley states a rule
that is applicable to all conduct by landowners in their disposition of surface water
runoff whether the waters are discharged onto the land of an adjoining owner or
into a natural watercourse, as well as to the conduct of upper and lower riparian
owners who construct improvements in the creek itself . . . .
There is no exception from the rule of reasonableness for riparians.  No logic
would support such a distinction and we decline to recognize one.122
It is odd then, considering this trend toward a “merger” of the rules
based on the principles of tort law and no difference between the factual
situations that, in California, the rules pertaining to the two situations
continue to differ.  More peculiar is that this difference is based on arcane
principles of property law.
B. The Locklin Rule Should Prevail—Serving Policy Concerns
A look at the differing rules indicates that the Locklin rule serves the two
stated policy concerns of the court more effectively than the Keys rule.  As
to economic efficiency, the rules perform roughly the same.  Therefore, the
Locklin rule should supplant the Keys rule in all situations.
The Locklin rule more effectively promotes development.  Because a
reasonable uphill landowner can be found liable under the Keys rule, the
Keys rule actually retains a portion of the absolute liability component that
the old civil law surface water rule contained.  The potential for absolute
liability engendered by the Keys rule can be a formidable disincentive to
development.  On the other hand, under the Locklin rule, an uphill
landowner can rely on her reasonable conduct to insulate her from liability. 
Like the Locklin rule, the rule of reasonableness as adopted in other
jurisdictions immunizes the reasonable uphill owner even in surface water
fact-based determinations of reasonableness in the particular circumstances of
each case.
Id. (citation omitted).
122. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 357, 867 P.2d at 742, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.  The court
also stated:  “[A]lthough Keys v. Romley was decided in the context of damage caused
to adjacent land by the discharge of surface waters, the reasoning of the court has
broader applicability.”  Id.
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cases.123  The Locklin rule serves to more effectively enhance the incentive
to develop by eliminating the possibility of absolute liability.
The Locklin rule is arguably more equitable and more reasonable than
the Keys rule as well.  The Keys rule and the civil law rule might reflect an
effort by the courts to create an incentive for uphill landowners to
discharge surface waters into natural drainage paths.124  This theory might
reconcile the difference between these rules.  Nevertheless, today, if the
two stated goals of the court are equity as between the parties and the
promotion of development, it follows that developers should be able to
arrange for drainage from their land in any manner they wish, so long as
the drainage plan is reasonable.  Restriction of an uphill landowner's ability
to discharge water reasonably from her land seems inherently unfair and
is a disincentive to development.
Thus, not only does the Locklin rule more effectively enhance the
incentive to develop, it arguably leads to more equitable results. 
Expanding the Locklin approach to surface water cases and abandoning the
Keys rule would cure the inconsistencies of the civil law rule.
On the other hand, the Keys rule might be seen as closer to the bright
line rule sought by economists to promote efficient decision-making.  In
fact, the Keys rule might create an incentive for uphill owners to seek
economically efficient solutions to potential problems since the specter of
absolute liability exists.  However, because damages are several under
either the Keys rule or the Locklin rule, this incentive is drastically
undercut.125  The Locklin court held that an uphill landowner could only be
found liable for that portion of the increased flow in a watercourse caused
by his actions.126  It is implicit in the Keys decision that damages be
123. E.g., Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 859
S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1993).  The Missouri court stated that the thrust of the rule of
reasonableness is that “each possessor is privileged to make a reasonable use of his
land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to
others, but incurs liability when his harmful interference . . . is unreasonable.”  Id. at
689 (citing Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 8 (N.J. 1956)).  See also Peterson
v. Town of Oxford, 459 A.2d 100 (Conn. 1983).  The Connecticut court stated that the
rule of reasonableness “permits the cost of land development to be allocated to the
developer rather than the adjoining landowners” when the developer's actions are
unreasonable.  Id. at 103.
124. The courts, however, are silent on this point.
125. See infra note 134-37 and accompanying text.
126. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 360, 867 P.2d at 744, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.  The court
stated:
An owner in the lower reaches of a natural watercourse whose conduct has a
relatively minor impact on the stream flow in comparison with the combined
effect of actions by owners in the upper reaches of the watercourse may not
be held liable for any damage caused by the stream flow beyond the
proportion attributable to such conduct.
Id.
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apportioned as well.127  Since many properties drain into any single
watershed or onto any single downhill property, the Locklin court posited
that liability would generally be spread among many defendants with no
single defendant drawing an unwieldy burden.128  Because the cost of
liability would most likely be small per defendant, the Locklin court
reasoned that the possibility of such liability would not create a
disincentive to development.129  Severability of damages, however, as will
be shown, also diminishes the incentive for uphill defendants to seek
efficient solutions.  Thus, neither the Keys rule nor the Locklin rule provide
a particularly effective incentive for defendants to make economically
efficient decisions.
Economic efficiency, as discussed earlier, is best served by a bright line
rule under which the parties can easily determine at the outset who will be
liable for the costs of damage.130  The economist would prefer to let the
developers develop without restriction, or make them pay for whatever
damage they cause.  The economist is indifferent between the two
possibilities and cares only that a nebulous rule, such as the rule of
reasonableness, not be imposed.
The common law “common enemy doctrine” was such a bright line
rule.131  Likewise, the civil law watercourse rule immunized uphill
landowners from liability for adding water to a watercourse or improving
127. When damages are divisible in California, they are apportioned.  See infra
notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
128. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 338, 867 P.2d at 729, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.  The court
stated:
[B]ecause the development of any property in the watershed of a natural
watercourse may add additional runoff to the stream, all of which may
contribute to downstream damage, it would be unjust to impose liability on an
owner for the damage attributable in part to runoff from property owned by
others.  Therefore, an owner who is found to have acted unreasonably and to
have thereby caused damage to downstream property, is liable only for the
proportion of the damage attributable to his conduct.
Id.
129. Id. at 360, 867 P.2d at 744, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.  The court reasoned:
If the rule were otherwise, owners at the lowest reaches of a watercourse
could preclude development of upstream property by imposing on a single
upstream owner the cost of all damage caused by the addition of surface water
runoff if that addition combined with the existing stream flow damaged the
lowest properties.
Id.
130. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  Briefly, recall that the common
enemy doctrine gives a landowner the absolute right to repel water from his land.
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the watercourse itself.  In this way the downhill owner was given an
incentive to negotiate a solution that would be more cost efficient than
actual payment of the total amount of damage.132  The cost efficient
solution is an overall economic benefit to society because it conserves
resources and allows them to be channeled into more productive areas.133 
Therefore, cost efficient solutions should be promoted.
The Locklin rule, however, undercuts the incentive to negotiate for a cost
efficient solution.  First, it is a rule of reasonableness which creates a
question of fact to be determined on a case by case basis.  Since neither
party is sure who will be liable for the costs of damage, neither party is
given an incentive to expend resources remedying the situation
beforehand.  Second, even though the rule attempts to shift liability to the
unreasonable uphill owner, that same unreasonable owner can escape
liability provided the downhill owner is unreasonable as well.  In this way,
the rule functions like a contributory negligence rule.
This contributory negligence aspect of the rule alters the calculus of the
uphill owner and creates an even greater disincentive for the uphill owner
to seek efficient remedies because even though the uphill owner may have
acted unreasonably, by convincing a trier of fact that the downhill
landowner acted unreasonably as well, the uphill owner can escape liability
altogether.  Whereas under the common law rule, or the civil law rule, the
land owners knew who would be responsible for the costs of damage, the
Locklin rule is not so clear.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that a rule of reasonableness, in fact,
creates an incentive for the parties to act carefully, and that careful activity
from the outset heads off injury in the future.  The incentive to act
carefully is created because a court at any time could determine that the
respective activities of either party are unreasonable.  The parties, under a
rule of reasonableness, do not know where they stand.  Thus, careful
activity from the outset lessens the possibility of liability.  “Careful”
activity, however, does not necessarily lead to the efficient solution.  When
damages are less expensive than “careful” activity, the efficient solution
becomes payment of damages.
Regardless, severability of damages under the Locklin rule undercuts the
incentive to act carefully as well.  Under the Locklin rule, a court is
instructed to apportion the damages in any given case.134  Any given
132. See supra notes 100-01 and the accompanying text where the hypothetical
demonstrates that the economically efficient solution was abatement for $80,000, rather
than clean up for $120,000.
133. See supra note 91-94 and accompanying text.
134. It should be noted that multiple defendants are probably not as likely in the
surface water scenario, which usually involves only two properties, as it would be in the
watercourse scenario where properties for several miles might be affected.
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defendant's portion of liability will most likely be small compared with the
costs of being “careful.”  In this way, the Locklin rule functions similarly
to comparative negligence regarding its effect on the incentive to seek
efficient solutions.135
Returning to the hypothetical:136 again, assume that the cost of damage
is around $120,000, and the cost of abatement is approximately $80,000. 
If either owner knows he will be responsible for the cost of cleanup, i.e.,
$120,000, then the logical thing to do would be to seek a less expensive
alternative.  In this case, either party would choose to abate the problem for
$80,000.  This is the efficient solution.  If we operated under a true
comparative negligence regime (let us assume fault is apportioned 50% to
lower owner, and 50% to upper owner), the most either would have to pay
if damage occurred would be $60,000.  The incentive to choose the
efficient $80,000 solution is eliminated, and $40,000 (the difference
between $120,000 and $80,000) is lost to society.
Similar to the comparative negligence regime, under the Locklin rule, a
defendant's share of damages will generally be somewhat less than the
total.  If several developments lie along a watercourse and a remote
downhill owner is damaged, the possibility exists that many of the uphill
owners will be partially responsible for the damage.  If there are ten
defendants and each one is ten percent responsible, then in our
hypothetical, each defendant will be responsible for $12,000 in damages. 
Certainly no single defendant would have an incentive to seek the
economically efficient $80,000 solution,137 and transaction costs would
most likely eliminate the possibility that the ten defendants could share the
cost of the $80,000 solution.  The Locklin rule should be altered to create
such an incentive.
C. The Need For Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability among defendants may provide the appropriate
incentive for defendants who have acted unreasonably to seek cost efficient
135. This does not imply that courts will apportion damages between plaintiffs and
defendants in these cases as they would in actual comparative negligence cases.  It
simply means that in these cases there are generally multiple defendants each partially
responsible for the damage such that liability is spread among various parties.  The Keys
rule suffers from the same problem.
136. Again, this hypothetical assumes that transaction costs do not exist.
137. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text, discussing the effect of
transaction costs on negotiations for efficient solutions.
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solutions.138  At common law, liability against joint tortfeasors was joint
and several.139 Today, in California, the courts have retained the ability to
impose joint and several liability in appropriate situations.140  However, the
law has moved toward a policy of severing damages when an actor's
contribution to the harm is divisible.141  The holding in Locklin makes it
clear that the court believed damages of the sort under consideration here
to be divisible and therefore subject to apportionment.
Nevertheless, joint and several liability under these circumstances may
still be appropriate.  Joint and several liability went out of favor at the
same time comparative negligence swept tort law.142  Prior to the advent of
comparative negligence in California, the courts would not allocate
responsibility among defendants.143  It has been argued that prior to Li v.
Yellow Cab,144 “the doctrine of contributory negligence cast a moral stone
against the `guilty' tortfeasor by the completely `innocent' plaintiff.”145 
Since only a morally blameless plaintiff could recover, defendants could
not complain when damages were not apportioned.146  The courts would
not “permit an innocent plaintiff to suffer as against a wrongdoing
138. Note that joint and several liability would not impose on a defendant liability
for damage which was innocently caused, i.e., damage that occurred naturally.  Only
damage attributable to culpable activity is compensable.
139. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 47 (4th ed. 1971).
140. See American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 586 578 P.2d
899, 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 186 (1978); see also United States v. Imperial Irrigation
Dist., 799 F. Supp. 1052, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (applying California law and holding
that “multiple tortfeasors are jointly liable only where they contribute to an indivisible
injury”).
141. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431 (Deering 1986 and Supp. 1992).  In the realm of
tort law, the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986 (known as the deep pocket initiative)
effectively retained joint and several liability for economic damages, but made liability
for non-economic damages several.  Id. § 1431.2.
 Restatement (Second) of Torts section 433A(1) states:  “Damages for harm are to be
apportioned among two or more causes where (a) there are distinct harms, or (b) there is
a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1979).
In addition, section 881 states:  “If two or more persons, acting independently,
tortiously cause distinct harms or a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for
division according to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for the
portions of the total harm that he has himself caused.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 881 (1979).
142. See generally Erwin E. Adler, Allocation of Responsibility After American
Motorcycle  v. Superior Court, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1978); Li v. Yellow Cab, 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (instituting comparative negligence in
the state of California).
143. Adler, supra note 142, at 15; see, e.g., Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal.
2d 409, 434, 218 P.2d 17, 32 (1950).
144. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
145. Adler, supra note 142, at 15.
146. Id. at 18
666
G   C:\WP51\DOCS\LAWREVIE\32-2\BOOK\LENAIN.FMT Wed, 24-Oct-18  09:34 am   G
[VOL. 32: 637, 1995] Surface Waters in California
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
defendant.”147  Today, however, com- parative negligence does exist in
California, and plaintiffs no longer need to be morally blameless to recover
for their injuries.  Therefore, the “innocent plaintiff” justification no longer
exists for holding one defendant responsible for the entire burden of an
accident when the plaintiff may have, in fact, contributed to his own
injury.148
Water law, however, has not gone as far as Li v. Yellow Cab in applying
tort law principles.  The Locklin rule is actually analogous to the pre-Li v.
Yellow Cab contributory negligence regime rather than the post-Li
comparative negligence regime which is in place today in California.149  In
the Locklin realm, the moral impetus still exists to favor the “innocent”
plaintiff.
Joint and several liability, in this arena, is also desirable for three other
reasons.  First, as mentioned above, joint and several liability would create
an incentive for defendants to seek economically efficient solutions to
avoid joint liability.  Second, joint and several liability imposed upon this
class of defendants in this situation would help to minimize the impact of
transaction costs.  And third, joint and several liability is necessary to shift
the scales of equity back toward compensating reasonable downhill
plaintiffs.
Joint and several liability re-establishes some of the incentive for the
unreasonable defendant to seek economically efficient solutions because
it eliminates the comparative negligence problem.150  A single uphill
defendant could be held responsible for the entire judgment.  Returning to
the previous hypothetical, a defendant in this situation would be
responsible for $120,000 although he may have only caused $12,000 worth
of damage.  In this way, the incentive for this defendant to seek the
$80,000 solution is replaced.
Imposing joint and several liability on this class of defendants is
appropriate because it helps diminish the effects of transaction costs.  Until
now, this analysis has assumed that transaction costs do not exist.  This is
helpful to the analysis, but not realistic.  Courts seeking to further
economic efficiency should be sensitive to transaction costs in fashioning
147. Finnegan, 35 Cal. 2d at 434, 218 P.2d at 32.
148. Adler, supra note 142, at 18.  Professor Adler also notes:  “Fairness dictates
that the blameworthiness of all actors in an incident be treated on a consistent basis.” 
Id. at 15.
149. See supra note 143.
150. See supra note 137 accompanying text.
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their rules.151  Transaction costs do exist, and they can be quite large.152 
When transaction costs added to the cost of a potentially efficient solution
exceed the cost of damage, then the “efficient” solution is no longer
efficient.153  Thus, where there are positive transaction costs, the efficient
outcome may not occur even under the brightest of bright line rules. 
Therefore, “in these circumstances, the preferred legal rule is the rule that
minimizes the effects of transaction costs.”154
An economist might insist that these uphill landowners be held
absolutely liable for their actions because absolute liability imposed on this
class of defendants would minimize transaction costs.155  The California
Supreme Court, however, deferring to its pro-development policy and its
desire to encourage and reward reasonable behavior, would most likely shy
away from such a harsh outcome—no matter how efficient it may be.156
However, when defendants are found to have acted unreasonably, joint
and several liability would be a step in an efficient direction.  As noted
above, the Locklin rule appropriately imposes liability on the unreasonable
defendant when the plaintiff has been reasonable.  This result, coupled
with joint and several liability, would place liability for the entire judgment
on the party who would most likely require the least amount of negotiating
151. Cf. COASE, supra note 92, at 132. The author states:
[T]he problem which we face in dealing with actions which have harmful
effects is not simply one of restraining those responsible for them.  What has
to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the
loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action
which produced the harm.  In a world in which there are costs of rearranging
the rights established by the legal system, the courts, in cases relating to
nuisance, are, in effect, making a decision on the economic problem and
determining how resources are to be employed.
Id.
152. Id. at 114.  Coase states:
In order to carry out a market transaction, it is necessary to discover who it is
that one wishes to deal with, to inform [the] people that one wishes to deal
[with] and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to [the] bargain,
to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that
the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.
Id.
153. See POLINSKY, supra note 91, at 12; see also COASE, supra note 92.
154. POLINSKY, supra note 91, at 13.  The author further states that the effects
referred to include the effects of actually incurred transaction costs as well as “the
inefficient choices induced by a desire to avoid transaction costs.”  Id.
Returning to the hypothetical, an example of an inefficient choice induced by the
desire to avoid transaction costs would be, assuming an unrestricted right to develop, a
downhill landowner simply paying $120,000 because the cost of negotiating with the
uphill landowner for removal of the concrete embankments would most likely exceed
$40,000.
155. Transaction costs would be minimized because uphill owners under these
circumstances are usually in a position to remedy the situation unilaterally.
156. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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to abate the problem,157 and the party who arguably has the most resources. 
These cases usually involve municipalities or large developer defendants
against individual property owner plaintiffs.158  The uphill defendants are
usually in a better position to take the prophylactic measures necessary,
when efficient, to head off damage.159  Joint and several liability eliminates
the need for these defendants to negotiate amongst themselves for the
efficient solution; rather, any single defendant likely to be pursued by the
plaintiff for the full amount of the judgment, i.e., the defendant with the
most resources, will be given an incentive to seek a solution independent
of the other defendants.
Furthermore, joint and several liability, arguably, leads to more equitable
results overall.  As to the downhill landowner, the Locklin rule eliminates
the protection of the Keys rule whereby absolute liability flows to the
uphill owner when both parties act reasonably.160  As suggested by this
Comment, the Locklin rule should subsume the Keys rule in all factual
scenarios.  This result would promote development, but potentially at the
expense of reasonable downhill landowners.  Joint and several liability
would tilt the scales back slightly in favor of the reasonable downhill
landowner by helping to ensure compensation for unreasonable damage to
such a downhill landowner's property.
At the same time, development should not be severely retarded by the
imposition of joint and several liability on defendants in these cases.  In
157. This is because the downhill owner will most likely agree to whatever
remedial measures the uphill owner takes.  Whereas if liability were reversed, a
downhill owner might have to engage in lengthy negotiations with an uphill owner to
alter the uphill developer's plan of development to abate the problem.
158. E.g., Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 867 P.2d 724, 27 Cal. Rptr.
2d 613 (1994); Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955); Archer
v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941); O'Hara v. Los Angeles
County Flood Dist., 19 Cal. 2d 61, 119 P.2d 23 (1941); San Gabriel v. Los Angeles
County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554 (1920); Larrabee v. Town of Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96,
63 P. 143 (1900); Ektelon v. City of San Diego, 200 Cal. App. 3d 804, 246 Cal. Rptr.
483 (1988); Deckert v. County of Riverside, 115 Cal. App. 3d 885, 171 Cal. Rptr. 865
(1981).
159. In this context, joint and several liability would increase the pressure to find
an efficient solution on those not only with the deepest pockets, but on those aware of
the potential danger to begin with.  A downhill landowner may have no idea what the
impact of development five miles up a watercourse may be on her property.  Further,
she may not even know that the development is taking place.  It is desirable to place as
much pressure on the uphill developers, who are often the only parties aware of the
potential dangers, to act reasonably, efficiently, and prophylactically.
160. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
669
G   C:\WP51\DOCS\LAWREVIE\32-2\BOOK\LENAIN.FMT Wed, 24-Oct-18  09:34 am   G
theory, uphill owners who are forced to pay for more than their share of
damage for any given accident should still be able to look to their co-
defendants for indemnity or contribution.161
A rule that takes all of the policy concerns into consideration is one that
encourages the parties to act reasonably so that damage is averted,162 is one
that does not place a undue burden of liability on reasonable uphill
landowners such that development is curtailed, and is one that compensates
a reasonable plaintiff for his unreasonable losses.  The Locklin rule,
coupled with joint and several liability goes the farthest in achieving the
desired result.  The Locklin rule imposes no liability on an upstream owner
who acts reasonably.163  This promotes reasonable development.  The rule
also eliminates the right of redress for a downstream owner who acts
unreasonably.164  This too promotes development, and discourages
unreasonable behavior.  These two aspects of the Locklin rule tilt the scales
in favor of the uphill developer.  Joint and several liability would help to
insure that downhill landowners are compensated for any unreasonable
losses they sustain.  This is an equitable result. Joint and several liability
would also provide an incentive for potential defendants to seek cost
efficient solutions that avoid accidents.
V. CONCLUSION
Ironically, in announcing a merger of the rules governing water flow
law, the California Supreme Court in Locklin seems to have done the
opposite.  Although the definitional differences between surface water,
water flowing within a natural watercourse, and flood water seem to have
been “abandoned” by the courts, as a practical matter it is incumbent upon
the practitioner to ascertain which kind of water he or she is dealing with
161. As Restatement (Second) of Torts section 886A states:  “[W]hen two or more
persons become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm, there is a right of
contribution among them . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979).
Further, it is not unprecedented for contribution among co-defendants to be judicially
adopted.  See HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT 255 (2d ed. 1987).
162. The prophylactic activity of the uphill owner should be included in the
reasonableness calculation.  Some courts expressly include the prophylactic actions of
the uphill owner in their reasonableness calculations.  See, e.g., Martin v. Weckerly, 364
N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1985).  The court stated:  “[D]rainage of surface waters complies with
the reasonable-use rule: . . . (b) If reasonable care be taken to avoid unnecessary injury
to the land receiving the burden . . . .”  Id. at 95.
163. Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 360, 867 P.2d 724, 744, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 613, 633 (1994).  The court stated:  “[I]f the upper landowner acts reasonably
. . . the lower riparian owner must continue to accept the burden of damage caused by
the stream water.”  Id.
164. Id.  The court stated:  “[I]f the lower owner has not acted reasonably to protect
his property, the lower owner must continue to accept the burden of the damage caused
by the stream water.”  Id.
670
G   C:\WP51\DOCS\LAWREVIE\32-2\BOOK\LENAIN.FMT Wed, 24-Oct-18  09:34 am   G
[VOL. 32: 637, 1995] Surface Waters in California
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
because, in reality, three different rules still apply to the three different
situations.
The California Supreme Court should adopt a rule for both surface water
and watercourse cases similar to that announced in the Locklin decision,
but should also modify that rule by imposing joint and several liability
among the various co-defendants.  By doing this, the court could achieve
a net increase in the promotion of the three policy objectives outlined
above, and, in fact, merge the rules governing surface waters and waters
flowing within a natural watercourse.
ADAM C. LENAIN
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